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This paper investigates the determinants of public sector pension plan investment and
funding behavior. Its goal is to draw lessons which may be used to improve the design and
governance of public pensions. Plan performance is related to characteristics of the pension
systems' governance structure and authority, using a new survey of U.S. state and local public
pension plan governance practicesand performance outcomes.
The study suggests that most large public pension systems funded their plans satisfactorily
in 1990, but some did not. Better public pension funding was associated with a pension system
having in-house actuaries and when pension Board members were required to carry liability
insurance. In contrast, public pension funding was lower when states experienced fiscal stress,
and when employees were represented on the pension system Board. Pension funding did not
appear sensitive to statutes guaranteeing benefits or funding levels, nor by the ability of states
to carry budget deficits from one year to the next. The results also suggest that public pension
Boards having more retiree-Trustees experienced lower investment returns, as did public sector
pension plans required to devote a portion of their assets to in-state investments. Returns did not
differ depending on whether a pension Board had in-house, or external money managers.
No single set of pension plan management practices can optimize plan performance for
all systems across all time periods. Nevertheless, these results suggest that care must be taken
when designing the regulatory and investment environment in which these plans operate.
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The cost of supporting retirees has risen quickly in both developed and developing nations,
and promises to become ever greater in decades to come. Policymakers seek to prepare for these
costs by designing better functioning pension plan structure.s. An item at the top of the policy
agenda is to improve public pension plan investment and funding performance. This paper
examines public sector pension plais in the United States, asking why some plans appear to have
been well-managed and what structural design features are associated with good pension
management outcomes.
The two pension plan performance outcome measures of central interest in this paper are
the yields on public pension system assets, and the public pension plans' funding status.
Investment performance is important since higher yields reduce the need for additional taxes to
support current and future retirees. Pension funding is important since better funded plans stand a
better chance of having assets on hand to pay promised benefits. This study relates these two
pension plan outcomes to a variety of features characterizing each pension system's governance
structure and authority, reporting requirements, and other factors affecting the environment in
which the pension funds operate. A new data set on more than 200 state and local public sector
plans in the U.S. is used to examine the relationship between public sector plan performance and
management practices, seeking to draw lessons which might improve the design and governance of
public pensions here and in other countries.
Section 1 of the paper develops several hypotheses regarding public pension plans
investment performance and pension governance, while Section II examines determinants of
funding patterns. Empirical analysis in Section ifi suggests that public plan investment
performance and funding outcomes are linked to characteristics of the pension Board itself, and
also to public sector mandates regarding investment and asset allocation. Section IV tests the
sensitivity of the results to alternative empirical specifications. Finally, Section V draws lessons
MitchellandHsin -PublicPension Governance and Performance -1/5/94from this rescarchforpolicymakers in other countries, in the expectation that they may benefit
from the experience of public pension plans in the United States.
I.The Determinants of Public Pension Investment Performance
Often referred to as "public employee retirement systems" (PERS), retirementsystems
established for individuals employed by state and localgovernments have become large and
powerful institutions in the last three decades. Typically these are defined benefitpension plans,
which provide workers an annual benefit accrual (usuallya function of pay and years of service).
This accrual converts into a retirement annuitypayment when the employee attains a specified age
and service under the plan. Recentsurveys show that there are approximately 2,400 public
pension systems in the U.S., covering about 10 million full-time public sectoremployees and
about 3 million pension beneficiaries --mainlyemployees of state and local governreents, and
often teachers and other school employees,police and firefighters, judges, correctional officers,
and other public servants (see Table l).1 Theseplans pay relatively generous benefit levels
amounting to 40% of pre-retirement pay at relatively young retirementages; usually PERS
retirement benefits are at least partially indexed to inflation.
Benefit promises which accrue under PERS plans are liabilities that thesponsor is expected
to pay retirees at some future date. Practice variesas to whether public employers back up these
promises by making payments to a segregated pension trust fund, whichare then invested to
generate eventual benefit payments. Many PERS plans have succeeded inamassing substantial
funds: in the U.S., public pensions held about $730 billionat the end of the 1980's, accounting
for 5%ofthe country's total financial assets, 13% of all domestic bonds, andalmost 8% of all
domestic equities (Hoffman and Mondejar 1992).
A major responsibility of those charged withmanaging public sector pensions is to direct
the investment of these assets. Researchsuggests that PERS funds have been managed somewhat
1Excluded from the PERS designation arenationalmilitary and federal government employee plans, as well as federal SocialSecurityold-age pensions. These plans are, for the most part, unfunded systems.
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only a negligible fraction of state and local plan assets, while government securities and corporate
bonds were much more heavily favored than private plans (see Table 2). This pattern of asset
holdings was in part motivated by state and local government rules prohibiting pension managers
from investing in what were perceived to be "risky' assets including equity, venture capital, and
foreign holdings.
Though these strictures have diminished in the last decade, yields on public pension fund
assets have frequently been low, with public plans earning rates of return substantially below those
of other pooled funds and often below leading market indices.2 Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate this
for the period 1968-86 as well as more recently, when state and local pension plans reported
annual returns averaging 11.1% while bonds rose by 15.5% and securities by 13.9%.
One explanation for why public plan investment yields are often low is that they are
operated according to principles different from those adopted in the private sector. Specifically,
many public pensions are managed by staff which must respond to political as well as economic
incentives and pressures. A typical public system is governed by a Board of Directors comprised
of eight members, on average, with three elected members, three appointed members (often by the
Governor), and two serving exofficio (eig.the State Treasurer, the superintendent of schools,
etc). Those elected to public pension Boards are frequently active employees, which is quite
uncommon in the private sector; in addition, in many cases retired workers are also included as
Board members (Zorn 1991).
Because public pension Boards are often managed by political appointees and covered
pension members, it is possible that the Boards select investments different from those chosen by
nonpension money managers competing in the capital market. There is little direct evidence on this
point in the public sector, but pension participants in the private sector appear to invest more
conservatively than do professional pension managers (EBRI 1993). Hence it is hypothesized that
2For a discussionofstudies on this topic see Beebower and Bergstrom (1977); Berkowitz et al (1986); Brinson et a!.
(1986); Grinbtan and Titman (1989); Ippotito (1989); and McCarthy and Turner (1992).
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betterperformance from public pensions could be observed when public systems manage their
funds professionally,instead of relying on former or current employees.
Another way thatpensiongovernance structures might alter PERS investment yields is that
Boardauthority varies agreatdeal acrosspublicpension plans, depending on lawswhichvary
from stateto state,and also depending on custom and tradition. For example, some PERS Boards
have a great deal of responsibility for investment decisions, they control actuarial inflation and
interest rate assumptions, and direct the system's reporting practices. In othercases, external
professional money managers and actuaries manage investments and reporting, leaving day-to-day
benefit payments and record-keeping functions to the Board. The latter tasks are substantial:public
sector pension plans reported an average of 42,000 active members per plan and $2.8 billion in
assets, with annual administrative costs totalling about 1-4% of assets.3 Large plans can service
many of these needs in-house, employing on the average one staff member per 1,000 plan
participants. Smaller plans are more likely to use external actuarial, legal, and accounting firms,
and frequently employ professional moneymanagers and/or investment consultants (Zorn 1991).
When private sector pension systems manage their benefits administration and investment
in-house, researchers have found substantial evidence of economies of scale in larger plans
(Mitchell and Andrews 1981). It is therefore possible that larger public pension plansmight also
experience higher yields than would smaller plans, though these scale economies could be captured
in smaller plans by hiring external professionalmoney managers and consultants. In addition to
size, investment style could lead to performance differences: for example, Top 10performance
group money managers apparently earn higher yields, though Lakonishok et al. (1991, 1992)
suggest that net returns are equalized after commissions. Below the analysis controls on plan size
and whether plans use investment managers in the Top 10 performancegroup.
In addition to management style, the literaturesuggests thatadditionalfactors can affect
pension asset performance. For example recent studies indicate that net investment returns in the
3See Mitchell, Sunden, Hsin and Reid (1993) for a discussion of administrativecosts in US public pension plans. and Sunden and Mitchell (1993)forcosts in the US Social Security system. Valdes Prieto (1993)comparesprivate
and public plan& adminstratjve costs in four nations.
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private sector are sometimes reduced when investment managers are subjected to frequent
performance reviews. This is because of a principal/agent problem: money managers sometimes
structure their portfolios to meet short-run objectives at the cost of long-run goals.4 In the public
sector context, PERS Boards using external money managers subject to frequent valuations might
face lower net rates of return than systems using only in-house managers, particularly if they are
evaluated relatively infrequently (ceteris paribus). Thus the empirical analysis of pension asset
yields must control not only on who is managing the portfolio, but also on how often they report
how they are doing.
Pension plan asset performance clearly depends on other factors in addition to the ones just
described, with perhaps the most important one being the fund's portfolio mix. As noted earlier,
public plans tend to hold fewer stocks than do private pensions, in part because the federal
government requires private pension fiduciaries to invest in a well-diversified portfolio of assets
chosen for traditional financial reasons. Furthermore, ERISA regulations governing private plans
specifically require pension fiduciaries to behave according to generally accepted financial
principles, a philosophy summarized as the "prudent man rule". In the public pension arena, no
federal legislation controls PERS investment pattems. As a result there are no legal constraints on
those who wish to deploy public pension assets for nontraditional investment purposes, and
several groups have become increasingly vocal.5 For example, the Governor of New York argues
that public pension assets be loaned advantageously to firms "conducting business" within his
state. Other states have asked their pension fund managers to only invest in so-called
"economically targeted" or "socially responsible" companies (defined variously as firms which do
not pollute, companies headquartered in-state, etc). While these unconventional investment
4This has been called "window-dressing" at year end so as not to be seen holding "losers (Benartzi and Thaler 1992.
and Laknonishok et al. 1991 and 1992).
51nthe UnitedStates, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ER.ISA) requires private sector
pension plan assets to be managed according to prudent and conservative investment practice. and furthermore holds
plan trustees personally responsible for the plan's investment practices. However ERISA does not cover PERS
plans. and efforts to extend national regulation to state and local pensions have been challenged by those who believe
that this would undermine states' taxing authority; see Munnell (1983).
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practiceshave their appeal, retirees and active workers have expressed concern that theirpension
assets may earn low returns, and perhaps be insufficiently diversified.6
These differences in PERS investment practices imply that publicpension plan returns may
vary because of strictures placed on the plans by the political process, strictures whichmay not be
in evidence in privately-run pension plans. As a result,empirical analysis of PERS performance
must take into account the risk characteristics of the pension portfolio, whether investorsoperate
under constraints such as ceilings on bond or stockholding, rules requiring fiduciaries to diversify
their portfolios in a manner which might be deemed"prudent" by impartial financial experts. or
requirements that money must be directed to "socially acceptable" ventures. If these stricturesare
effective, they may lower returns and/or increase risk.
IL The Determinants of Public Sector PensionFunding Practices
Federal law in the United States requires private-sectorpension plan sponsors to explicitly
recognize their accumulating pension liabilities, arid then to set aside contributions inan orderly
fashion so as to build up assets sufficient tomeet benefit promises when workers retire. The
rationale for full pension funding in theprivate sector is that sponsoring companies may go
bankrupt, and unless the pension plan has received assets sufficientto cover benefit promises,
retirees could face curtailed or terminated benefitpayments.7
In the public sector, pension funding practice has been muchmore variable, both in the
U.S. and elsewhere. This is partly becausemany deem the risk of government bankruptcy to be
low, and thus less persuasive as a rationale forprefunding. As a result, partially-funded or
compietely unfunded (pay-as-you-go or PAYGO)plans have been the norm for most developed
and many developing nations around the world(James 1993). At the state level in the U.S.,
6See tot instanceGoldman, Sachs (1993), NewYork State Industrial Cooperation Council(1989, 1990),New York Retired PublicEmployeesAssociation (1989), and Snell and Wolfe (1990).
7Cessationof benefits has become less likely since ERISAregulations established a government insurance agency
for private sector defined benefit private pensions. On theoUier hand the pension insurance agency is not completely stable financially, and the risk of private pensionunderfunding is now borne primarily by groups other than those
retirees in the underfunded plan; see Gustman and Mitchell (1992).
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fundingpractices also vary: m some cases state laws require prefunding for accumulating pension
liabilities, but in other cases they do not. (For constitutional reasons, the Federal government has
not regulated state-level public pensions; see Munnell 1983).
Despite the PAYGO tradition, there are several arguments in support of substantial pension
prefunding in the public sector. Funds invested earn the pension plan investment income which
"can substantially reduce the employer's ultimate payment for such benefits" (Bleakney 1972: 16);
this may take on special urgency gi'i/en the aging of the public sector workforce over the next
decades (Mitchell 1991). Also, underfunded pensions impose an implicit future liability on
taxpayers, reducing states' and localities' ability to raise funds in other ways (Epple and Schipper
1981). Public sector retiree income security might also be threatened by underfunding; indeed
some public employees have sought to offset the risk of underfunded pension promises by
demanding higher pay (Inman 1982, 1986; Mitchell and Smith 1994 forthcoming; Smith 1981).
Finally, some analysts argue that PAYGO systems decrease savings and impose politically
unpalatable redistributive burdens across cohorts (James 1993).
Despite these arguments favoring prefunding of benefit promises, public sector pension
plans have typically accumulated fewer assets relative to benefits than do their private sector
counterparts (see Table 5). During the 1980's many public employers contributed less to their
public employees' pension accounts than they were required to (according to actuarial
computations), in part because public tax collections fell in American states and cities during the
recession. As a result, some public pensions became (or grew more) underfunded, meaning that
plan assets were insufficient to cover benefits promised to retirees. A study of 1989 data showed
that state and local employer pension contributions were about 10-15% below target, and the
pattern of shortfall was most persistent for systems where unemployment was higher than it had
been for some time. This effect persisted even when controlling for habit persistence, holding
constant past cumulative funding levels (Mitchell and Smith 1992, forthcoming 1994). Therefore
a full analysis of funding must take into account the possibility that fiscal stress undermines PERS
plans financial stability.
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The structure of PERS Boards canalsoaffect pension funding. One possibility is that
Boardcomprisedof pension-covered members may meet funding requirements more promptly
thanone heavilyweighted with politicalappointees.8Working counter to this hypothesis is the
lact that pension funding is an extremely complex and difficult area, whichactiveand retired
workers may he unable to fully scrutinize. Lack of adequate technical training combines with
conservatism regarding investment risk, on top of which is the fact that pensionparticipants
typically have very poor understanding of their plan's rules and features (Mitchell 1988) For this
reason, having professional representatives on the PERS Board could improve funding, especially
as compared to relatively nontechnical pension participants. Which effect dominates is anempirical
matter.
In addition to Board composition, other PERSmanagement practices can also influence
funding outcomes directly. Specifically, some systems use in-house staff actuaries,increasing
funding if these staffers are relatively free from political suasion, but decreasing it otherwise.
When the PERS Board is required to authorize benefit increases, rather thansimply passing on
increases negotiated by state and local employeesindependently, this could translate into higher
funding rates --afterall, authorization to provide future benefits would be required from those
managing the funding process. It is also worth investigating whether funding isimproved when
Board members have liability insurance, which if truesuggests that the private insurance market
may enforce funding stringencies on PERS Boards when political tensions pull in other directions.
Another set of factors influencing fundingmay be the reporting requirements to which
pension managers respond. While public pensionaccounting practice embraces some common
assumptions and standards across states and localities, the remaining differences make it difficultto
compare public plan investment performance and funding outcomes in some cases. Thisproblem
8Elements of this were present in the courtcase recently filed by California state retirees, who protested the
Governor's effort to reduce state budget deficits byraising the public pension plan's assumed interest rate from 8.5% to9.5%. Retirees contended that "manipulating the rate of returnon plan investments, though within legally
'reasonable limits', can substantially reduce employer contributionsto the point where a pension plan can be
substantially underfunded and put at high risk." (Hemmerick 1991b: 39). When theexisting PERS Board refused to
implement the Governor's proposal, he then moved to dissolve the old Board andconstruct a new Board more
receptive to his proposals.
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hasbeen recognized by many pension analysts over the years, and is slowly being remedied by the
Governmental Accountmg Standards Board which is devising a framework for public pension
financial reporting (GASB 1992). The majority of large state and local plans now conform to
GASB Statement No. 5(GASB1986) which specifies that public pension plans must report assets
at market value, and liabilities measured according to a concept known as the Pension Benefit
Obligation (PBO).9 As a result of this increasing standardization, it is now much more likely that
stock funding ratios are accurate, by which is meant that pension assets are correctly computed as a
fraction of liabilities. This contrasts with practice a decade ago when most PERS plans reported
assets at cost, and used a variety of different methods to compute liability measures (Schmitt et ai.
1991 .Despitethis progress, a cross-plan analysis of funding still requires paying attention to
different approaches used in reporting assets and funding.
Along the same lines, it might be expected that more frequent reporting would tend to
induce standardization, so that better funding would be expected of a PERS required to report to its
sponsoring employer and participating members more often. Audits and actuarial valuations are
also carried Out at different intervals, and the reporting standards themselves vary. These different
reporting methods may simply affect data quality without altering investment and funding
performance, but many fear they have more potent effects altering plan outcomes materially. These
cross-plan differences should be controlled in empirical analysis, and examined to see if they
influence PERS funding outcomes materially.
Other variations in pension reporting are also important, particularly in the case where flow
funding measures are considered, where flow funding is defined as the ratio of annual actual
employer contributions, to annual required contributions. Variations in flow funding measures are
9The PBO includes five types of prospective pension liabilities as noted in Mitchell and Smith (1992): benefits
pledgedtocurrently retired employees, benefits pledged to vested terminated employees (based on past service and
salarylevels), benefits payable to vestedactive employees(based on currentserviceandsa'ary),benefits payable to
non-vested active employees who may vest in the future, and benefits that will be earnedbycurrent workers resulting
from future salary increases. The plan's PRO changes over time reflecting new expected benefit accruals; these yearly
accruals are termed the plan's "normal cost." To be actuarially sound, the employers annual contributions to the
planmustbemeet normalcosttoamortizeany pastunfunded pensionliabilities.
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due in part to laws governing pension funding practices which differacross states.'0 A related
problem arising in the reporting context arises when a system uses the PBO measure toreport
GASB-sanctioned funding measures, but uses some other actuarial method tocompute annual
required employer contributions. It is possible that a plan would thenappear well funded by the
officially recommended PBO measure, but would be less than fully funded by thesystems own
accounting measure.11 As a consequence, it is important to investigate whether differences in
funding patterns are related to different methods of computing liabilities for reporting,versus for
funding, purposes.
Funding differences may also result from other factors. In computing pension obligations,
for instance, actuaries employ a variety of assumptions tocompute promised future benefits.
Unbiased estimates of the factors of central interest require that theseassumptions be controlled in
the empirical analysis, by including plan-specific estimates ofexpected future price and wage
increases, assumed discount rates and retirementages, integration of benefits with Social Security,
whether benefit levels were guaranteed by law, andportability of pension accruals. Pension
systems also have some leeway with regard to their past service liability amortizationperiod, which
refers to the time period over which unfunded pensionpromises from the past are covered from
current contributions. Since it is possible that poorly funded plansstrategically select an
amortization period to improve the fundingreport, this too should be controlled on in a multivariate
funding analysis.
To this list of pension funding determinants must bejoined several indicators of the
regulatory and fiscal environment in which PERS Board members makefunding decisions. Most
t0As an example, fire and police pensionplans in Portland, Oregon are govererned by a law which sets the public
employers annual contribution rates as a fraction of payroll, and this contribution rate isgenerally met.
Consequently the pension financial statement indicates that the employer's actual contributionsare exactly equal to
required contributions, resulting in a flow funding rate of 100%. In fact, however, thesystem is operated on a
PAYGO basis; the flow funding figure reported by this plan doesnot represent the actuarial figures that the
accounting standards profession would prefer under its proposed reporting rules.
1This has apparently octurred in several instancesover the last two years, where employers were able to
dramatically cut their contributions after converting to new actuarial methods consistent with the PBOmeasure. For
a discussion of recent efforts by numerous public employers to change publicpension funding patterns see Durgin (1991). EmployeeBenefit Plan Review (1991),Hemmerik (1991 a and b), Price (1991), Shine (1991), and
Verhovek (1990).
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obviouslylinked the pension fundingoutcome is the existence of state-level legally mandated
funding requirements. One would anticipate that if such law is binding,itwould enhance funding
in those states. A variant of this point is that states experiencing severe fiscal stress tend to reduce
funding, suggesting that this too should be taken into account in multivariate analysis. Based on
previous work, we include a variable indicating fiscal stress, which is the deviation of the State's
unemployment rate from its long term trend (Mitchell and Smith 1994 forthcoming). It is
anticipated that greater fiscal stress would reduce funding, perhaps offset if contributions are
derived from a special or dedicated tax. In addition other "political economy variables" are
explored including an indicator of whether a state has a balanced budget requirement, to assess
whether pension underfunding serves as a "safety valve" in cases where the balanced budget rule is
taken seriously. Finally, there may be differences in plan participants' ability to exact full funding
rates, so it is important to control for the presence of unionized employees and teachers.
III. Empirical Analysis of Public Pension Yields and Funding
Thedatausedforempirical analysis are obtained from a cross sectional survey of 201
pension systems conducted in 1991, covering a total of 269separate retirementplans. The
PENDAT file created from this survey was provided by the Government Finance Officers'
Association (Zorn 1991). As of this writing, there is no larger, more up-to-date, and more
representative survey of state and local pension plans in the country; the federal government
collects no centralized information of this type (though many have suggested it should).
Respondent systems included in the PENDAT file represented 73% of state and local active
pension plan participants, and 71% of state and local plan assets in 1990 (Zorn 1991). These
systems represent the vast majority of the PERS-covered population, but are not necessarily
representative of all plans since they are among the largest in the nation, and probably better
managed and funded than many smaller plans; as a consequence, interpretation of results must bear
this caveat in mind. PERS plans responding to the survey accounted for about a tenth of the
estimated universe of State and local pension plans nationally.
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The PENDAT datafile is quite extensive, including variables reflecting all aspects of the
systems management, investment, and funding practices as well as plan participant and benefit
es2 The indicator of investment performance is used as a dependent variable for the
multivariate analysis (actual investment yield rates) and two measures of pension funding --stock
and flow funding patterns.
Taking the investment outcomes first, two different approaches were chosen to measure
public system's asset performance. Virtually all PERS report one datum for 1990 --thatyear's
total portfolio return (referred to below as YIROR). Most also reported their annualizedaverage
return over the period 1986-1990 (referred to below as Y5ROR). Both performance variables are
reported in nominal dollars (the analysis therefore assumes that all plans experienced identical
inflation rates). The fact that the investment yield is averaged over the 5-yearspan makes it
impossible to compute traditional measures of pension performance variability over time; estimates
of this concept must await development of panel data.
Two dependent variables were developed for the funding analysis. Theconcept which best
captures a plan's stock funding rate in the PENDAT survey expresses pension plan assets as a
fraction of the Pension Benefit Obligation, and for ease of reference this stockfunding measure is
termed AST PBO. An alternative measure focuses on the plan's current fundingpractices, a
concept captured here as FLOWFUND, or the ratio of actual to required employer contributions
for the year.
Explanatory variables in the analysis are grouped into five main categories: pension Board
composition, Board management practices, investment practices, reporting requirements and
assumptions, and other factors which reflect regulations at the state level governing budget and
'2When there were missing data, this was handled in severalways. Serious reporting errors in pension statistics
were recheckedwiththe PERS plan representatives directly. A complete list of data checks thus generated is
available from the author on request. For example the stock funding ratio for Wisconsinwas listed in the dataset as
1300%. which the plan representative indicated was incorrect. In the case ofmissing observations for some of the
explanatory variables used in regression models, the variable in question was assigned a value of 0, and concurrently
the missing value dummy variable was set to 1. Missing data on the dependent variable(e.g. investment
performance or funding) suggested the use of sample selection models to determine whethersystems which did report
their funding and investment yields had better (or worse) thanaverage outcomes; see Section IV.
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funding practices. Controls are also included for plan size, type of plan and covered employees,
and in some cases portfolio composition is incorporated on the grounds that plans with less risky
holdings will have lower returns.
Most of these variables were directly derived from the PENDAT file, but outside sources
were used in a few instances. The variable called TOP 10MG indicates whether the pension system
used a money manager in the Top 10 performance group as identified by Lakonishok ci al (1992).
The term UNEMPD represents the degree of fiscal stress experienced by the state proxied by the
deviation of the unemployment rate in 1990 from the mean of the previous nine years: previous
analysts suggest that this type of fiscal stress reduces funding possibilities (Mitchell and Smith
1994 forthcoming). The variable DEFPOS is also derived from outside sources, and indicates
whether a state is permitted to carry over a budget deficit from one year to the next Public pension
funding may be seen as an off-budget safety-valve, relieving the pressure of having to meet state
balanced budget requirements. Hence pensions may be better funded when state budget deficits
can be carried through time, while underfunding may prevail more often when state budgets must
be balanced, by law, at year's end.13




where Y1 represents a vector of variables reflecting public pension investment performance; Y2
represents a vector of funding variables; X1 -X4represent vectors of variables reflecting pension
Board composition, Board management practices, investment practices, reporting requirements and
'31f thereisalink between statebalanced budgetlaws and pension finding. it probablyarises whenstate pension
contribuuons are allowed to fluctuate depending on state budget needs,affordingpoliticiansonoff-budget method of
achieving compliance with balanced budget requirements.This can happensincemoststate budgets typicallydonot
include public pension systems in their regular budget reports. It is has not yet been determined whether the safety-
valve argument is empirically important. Certainly balanced budget mandates are widespread: a majority of states
(44) have balanced budget laws on the books, and most of these (37) require the governor to sign a balanced budget
(NASBO 1992). Only 13 states permit the governor to carryovera. I't'dget deficit from one year to the next,
providing flexibility which might obviate the need to use the public pension. This latter stance is deemed "most
sthngent" by NASBO, is represented in the DEFPOS variable developed for this study.
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assumptions:and Z represents a vector of other factors including state regulations governing
budgetandfunding practices, controls for plan size, type and in some cases portfolio composition.
In this section the disturbancetermsare assumed to be distributed normally with zero mean: in
Section IV this assumption and others, are discussed in more detail.
Evidence on the Investment Performance of State and Local Pension Systems
In 1990, the annual investment yield reported by the 168 PERS systems was 7.7% (see the
appendix Table). This compares favorably with market data showing a +6.8% return for securities
that year, and with the 1990 inflation rate of 6.1%. However, not all plans performed this well--
one plan reported a -5.5% return that year, while at the other extreme a plan reported a yield of
+24.5%.Thisrange is almost certainly dueto different portfolio composition patterns across the
plans: in the market as a whole, the +6.8% return for securities that year was offset by an average
3.2% yield on bonds, which suggests the importance of holding constant the portfolio composition
of pension plans when comparing their investment yields (see Figure 1). A narrower frequency
distribution of pension yields characterizes Y5ROR, returns averaged over the period 1986-1990
(see Figure 2). Across the 128 plans reporting the figure averaged 11.6%, with the lowest return
reported of -2.5% and the highest being 31%. The overall mean was lower than the annualized
return on bonds for the same period of 13.5%, but exceeded the average stock return of 10.1% as
well as the annualized inflation rate of 33%•l4
Table 6 provides multivariate regression estimates of equation (1) above, indicating the
determinants of pension plan investment yields. The findings show that the composition of the
public pension Board appears to matter: specifically, yields in 1990 were about 2% lower if
retiree representation on the public pension Boards increased by 10%. This may be the result of
inexpert Board members becoming increasingly activist of late, an explanation buttressed by the
fact that the retiree effect was negative but not statistically significant in the five-year yield
t4 1-year yield reported here differs from Zorn's (1991) 6.9% figure, and the 5-year annualized yield reported here
is lower than Zorns 13.9% figure; Zorn uses the PENDAT file but excludes many plans from the analysis (39 and
53plans, respectively).
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equation. This finding is not solely attributable to more conservative investment choices made by
retiree Boardmembers,since the model controls for the overall fractions of the portfolio held in
stocks and bonds.15Nevertheless,before concluding that retiree participation on pension Boards
is necessarily deleterious, it should be noted that appointed members might also depress asset
yields if they were improperly selected.
Of the several pension management practice variables used in the investment performance
equations, few had a powerful effect on pension yields. One influential practice was a system's
practice of permitting administrative costs to be charged to investment income (ADINVST), rather
than being covered from state or local budgets directly. This reduced the 5-year average return
figure at statistically significant levels, though the 1990 return was not powerfully affected. Some
state and local systems used outside money managers and financial counsellors, either in concert
with internal management, or exclusively. In any event, plans investing in-house or using external
money managers apparently fared about the same, even if the external managers were drawn from
the "Top 10" group (as identified by Lakonishok et al. 1992))6
Only a few of the rules regarding investment practices proved to statistically significantly
affect measured outcomes. In no case was the prudent man requirement statistically linked to
returns or investment variability; one explanation is that all pension Boards may defacto follow a
variant of this policy. The data aLso indicated no significant effect of state-mandated limits on
stockholdings on any of the investment performance variables. More serious is the negative return
observed for PERS pensions required to direct a portion of their investments in-state. This policy
is often recommended by those who propose to use pension funds to build a stronger job and Lax
base.'7 Unfortunately, plans following this policy experienced lower investment returns in 1990:
the results imply that 10% more in-state investments are associated with a 1% return. This effect
t5More complex risk adjustments could be undertaken in a ume series analysis, but cannot be undertaken in this
cross-sectional dataset.
6The PENDAT survey does not indicate whether the systems reported net or gross investment returns, but the
negative significant effcct of ADINVST suggests that the figures given were net of expenses. Other analysts have
suggested that higher gross yields produced by active money managers tend to be equalized after commissions
(Ippolito 1989).
t7See for example Goldman, Sachs (1993).
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wasnot detected using the 1985-90 average return data, but should not be ignored since it may
reflect recent trends which may not have beenobservedin earlier years.
Two factors used to quantify pension system reporting practices areincludedin Table 6. It
will be recalledthathaving independent investment performance analysts and more frequent
performance valuations could be predictedtoeither improve or depress investment yields,
depending on whether more reporting is seen as beneficial,orharmful (Lakonishok et al. 1991,
1992; Benartzi andThaler1992). The data do not support either position, however, since neither
variable iss strongly statistically significant.
Summarizing findings, some pension governance andmanagementfactors did affect yields
in the major public sector plans considered here. Three findings stand Out:
•Publicpension Boards having more retiree-Trustees experienced lower investment returns.
•Returns did not differdependingon whether a pension Board hadin-house,or external
money managers, even if the external managers were drawn from the "Top 10" group.
•Public plans required to devote a portion of their assets to state-specific projects earned
lower returns.
Funding PatternsAmong State and Local Pension Plans:
As noted earlier, many state and local pension plans follow GASB advisory rules when
reporting their pension assets and liabilities. This makes it possible to place some credence in
funding figures, particularly with regard to the ratio of the pension plan's assets to its promised
benefit liabilities (AST_PBO). The stock funding ratio averaged 91% in 1990 (for the 220 plans
reporting; see Figure 3). There is ample evidence of wide dispersion in funding practice: the
minimum stock funding ratio wasapproximately0 (for PAYGO plans), and 18 plans were
seriously underfunded, having less than half the assets needed to meet pension obligations.'8 On
the other hand, the maximum funding ratio was 3.2, and a third of the plans had sufficient assets to
meet projected benefits. For this reason the average stock funding rates of more than 90% should
not be taken as evidence that public plans were uniformly well-funded on an accumulated basis.
18Zorn (1991) reports a slightly lower stock funding ratio (89%) but uses a much smaller sample size (30 plans)
from the PENDAT survey.
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In contrast to stock funding measures, annual funding statistics capture whether the
employer is conthbuting enough each year enough to cover new benefit accruals and amortization
needs from past unfunded obligations. As mentioned earlier, however, there is reason to believe
these annual flow funding figures are biased upward: an employer reporting full compliance with
required contribution levels may sometimes receive monies inadequate to meet eventual benefit
promises. This probably explains why the average FLOWFUND ratio in 1990 was 93% (across
187 plans; see Figure 4). The range'about the mean is large: at one extreme a plan reported
receiving 3.4 times the amount required, while at the other extreme a plan indicated receiving -4.3
times what was required.'9 On the whole, the vast majority (137 of 187 plans) reported receiving
contributions less than 100% of required, suggesting that most public sector employers
contributions did not meet required levels iii 1990.
Multivariate evidence linking public pension governance and funding patterns according to
equation (2) is summarized in Table 7, where both stock and funding patterns are examined. A
first hypothesis was that public pension Board composition variables are related to stock funding
ratios, and there is support for this position. Specifically, the results show that having more
elected members on the Board lowered PERS funding rates, with retiree-Trustees having a larger
depressing effect.20 No composition effect was found in the flow funding equation, however.
Pension management practice also proved informative in explaining funding patterns: three
of the four variables used were positively related to stock funding patterns. For instance, the plans
appeared better funded when a PERS had in-house actuaries, and the effect was statistically
significant. Likewise, if the Board was required to authorize actuarial assumptions, stock and flow
funding were higher. There was a positive significant relationship between funding levels and
Board members having liability insurance: perhaps this is due to the increased oversight imposed
19The large negative funding figure was reported by a teachers plan which changed the actuarial method employed in
1990:acourt case concluded in 1993 denied the legality of this change.
2011 should be noted that fund tiustees appointed by politicians may not necessarily ensure that the plan is operated
for the sole benefit of the plan participant. For example, the California public employee retirement system sued the
Governor of that state for proposing to replace the 13-member pension board with a newly appointed 9-member
board, as welt as appointing the plan's actuary who agreed to the Governor's actuarial assumptions (Melbinger 1992).
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by private insurers. (On the other hand, flow funding was negatively related to liability coverage --
whichmay indicate reverse causality, if plans which underfunded on a flow basis were required to
purchase insurance in order to induce Board members to serve.)
Pension reporting and assumptions also affected funding outcomes as expected. Pension
systems differed according to the frequency and format of funding reports, and stock funding
ratios were lower where longer amortization periods were selected --indeed,it is possible that
amortization periods were strategically chosen to improve the funding report. Supporting this view
is the finding that plans which did not report their amortization period were even more seriously
underfunded than average. Clearly it is necessary to standardize on reporting in order to obtain a
clear picture of stock funding practices. Assumptions to compute promised future benefits also
played a role in the empirical analysis: the model included variables indicating expected future
price and wage increases, assumed discount rates and retirement ages, integration of benefits with
Social Security, and portability of pension accruals. Of this set, only the portability factorproved
statistically significant at conventional levels, and was negative. This is probably due to the fact
that asset accruals did not always follow employees who were permitted to take benefit accruals
with them when they changed jobs (usually this is limited to in-state moves). As such, it would be
incorrect to conclude that labor mobility per se reduces stock funding ratios: rather, fundingwas
low when systems permitted mobile workers to claim benefits with no concomitantasset
accumulation hacking up the promise.
Of the other factors controlled in the empirical funding anaiysis,very few had statistically
significant effects. Somewhat surprising was the null effect of state requirements that pension
plans had to be funded, requirements that benefit levels had to be guaranteed by law, and
requirements that states must balance their budgets from one year to the next. Nor were funding
levels different when dedicated or special taxes were earmarked for pension revenue.21Employee
21Thus these datado not supportMunnell and Ernsbergers (1989) suggestion that comminglingpensionfunding withother government budgets may exacerbate funding problems. Those authors also suggested that more
centralization might improvefunding, but thishypothesis is difficult to test in practice since centralization can refer
to many different aspects of plan management. Thus. for example, the actuanal assessmentmay be conducted
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type(i.e. teachers) and unionization status also had no effect. In fact, only one other variable was
found to systematically and powerfully reduce stock funding: namely, fiscal stress, measured here
by the deviation of recent unemployment from the levels experienced over the last decade. The
effect was substantial, suggesting that a one-point increase in a state's unemployment rate over the
long-run average would depress stock funding by 6 percentage points. This effect is consistent
with previous studies on public plans (Mitchell and Smith 1994, forthcoming), and suggests that
cconomic recessions have long as well as short-term effects on public budgets through pension
plan funding.
Because the stock funding data are better than the flow funding data, we emphasize those
models and findings. The following conclusions may be drawn:
•Better public pension funding was associated with a pension system having in-house
actuaries and when Board members were required to carry liability insurance.
•Public pension funding was lower when states had experienced fiscal stress, and when
employees were represented on the pension system Board.
•Funding did not appear sensitive to statutes guaranteeing benefits, or by legal funding
requirements, or by the ability of states to cany budget deficits from one year to the next.
IV. Sensitivity of Results
Several sensitivity tests were conducted to judge the robustness of the results. One concern
has to do with potential endogeneity of prticular variables in the regression equations. For
example, the performance equations included among the vector of control variables the PERS
portfolio mix, because the plan's stock and bond holdings were expected to have affected the
plan's investment performance. Nevertheless it could be argued that a system's 1990 return and
1990 portfolio mix are probably simultaneously determined, if one had in mind a more general
stnictural system involving expectations over variables not available in the data set. To test this
possibility, these potentially endogenous portfolio composition variables were purged from the
equation and the model re-estimated. This produced estimates virtually identical to those already
reported. In a similar vein, it might be asserted that the pension assumptions in equation (2) are
centrallyeven though contributions arecollected locally, thebenefits administration may bemanaged centrally even
thoughnegotiation over benefits isconductedlocally, and soforth.
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endogenously determined by politicians setting funding targets. Hence a reduced-form equation
was estimated which excluded pension assumptions from the model. Here too, coefficient
cstimates for the remaining variables were virtually identical to those reported here (results
available on request). Hence it appears that this form of simultaneity does not exert a potent effect
on the outcomes of most interest here, namely the pension governance and authority terms.
An additional question examined in some detail, but summarized here for the sake of
brevity, pertained to the issue of biased reporting due to selective missing data. This was handled
in two ways. First, if a pension plan had valid data on all but one (or a few) right hand side
variables, the missing datum was assigned a value of 0 and a missing-value indicator was given a
value of 1. This permitted maintenance of sample size due to incomplete reporting for pension
assumptions, in particular. A second approach was taken if the plan lacked a report for a
dependent variable, since this raised a question about whether the data were missing randomly.
Specifically, it might be that that those plans who were performing less well than the market, or
those who were more poorly funded than average, might not be reporting. For this reason, several
models were also estimated accounting for the probability of some plans not reporting investment
yields and funding ratios. In each case, a sample selection term derived from a Probit non-
reporting equation (inverse Mills ratio) was incorporated in the regression equations (1 and 2).
The selection controls proved to be not statistically significant in general, and other coefficient
estimates were quite similar to those reported here (result.; available on request).
The conclusion from the sensitivity analysis is that the results reported in Tables 6 and 7 are
quite robust to a reasonable range of alternative formulations. They also confirm the important role
of several pension governance features in public pension plan outcomes.22 It must be emphasized
that these behavioral patterns are derived from the data at hand, however, and are not necessarily
representative of those plans excluded from the PENDAT sample. Specifically, the findings are
22Several other models were also examined, including one which entered the state budget deficit variable into the
returns equations. The coefficient was not statistically significant and all other results were unchanged. Also
examined were models where the TOPIMGR term was replaced with a term indicating whether any external money
manager was used, and results were unchanged.
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most applicable to relatively large state-n.m plans. rather thr the smaller local and municipal public
plans covering a few officers or other uniformed public sector workers. As a result, the data are
not yet good enough to know whether these smaller plans have the same problems, and same
strengths. as their larger counterparts.
V. Conclusions and Discussion
After a decade of strong growth,publicpension plans in the United States are at a
crossroads. A few state and local retirement systems are experiencing problems, and some retirees
have experienced cuts in anticipated benefits as a result of these developments. In 1991, for
instance, cost-of-living clauses in California's public pension pian were disallowed, with funds
thus generated earmarked to "r(jU(employercontributions in fiscal year 1992-93 and subsequent
fiscal years until those amounts are depleted" (cited in Melbinger 1992: 23). In the future, if public
fund assets prove too meagre to meet benefit promises. retirees may face other benefit cuts.
In contrast to problems experienced in pension plans where public employers were subject
to fiscal distress, many public plans have done quite well. The strong capital markets of the
1980's boosted many pension systems' investment portfolios substantially. Increased assets
combined with careful money management and adequate employer contributions covered all or
most of the benefits promised to current and future retirees. This research suggests that better
performance from public pensions can be attained when plans manage their funds and actuarial
computations professionally instead of relying on employee-Trustees, and when they do not limit
their portfolios to local investments.
These conclusions should be tempered by several considerations. First, additional work is
required to control on portfolio risk characteristics, which have only been partly captured in the
models examined here. Second, future studies should focus more attention on public pension
Board activism and its potential effects on pension plan yields as well as risk. A question which is
only beginning to be asked is whether the social costs of underfunding and below-market return
investments can offset their social benefits. In other words, from a public finance viewpoint,
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'cconomicallv targeted" investments might be justified when the social gains to such investment
outweigh the social costs, taking care to note that the costs ;r.-iude potential retiree insecurity if
public pension underfunding leads to reductions in anticipated benefits. It would be useful to
design and implement such a cost/benefit framework when evaluating public pension asset
allocation and performance practices. In order to do this, time-series data must be collected which
can be examined using a common reporting and accounting framework. Policymakers and
researchers in the United States have begun to recognize this need, and have recommended
standardization of pension data gathering, possibly under the auspices of a federal agency
(Melbinger 1992; Mitchell 1991; Munnell 1983).
Because pension systems are extremely complex institutions, a single optimal package of
plan practices cannot be identified which is relevant to all systems and across all time periods.
Indeed, this research highlights some of the enormously complicated issues that must be
confronted when seeking to establish funding norms. If near-full funding of public pension plans
is deemed a worthwhile objective, it will be easier to monitor with standardization of pension
reporting practices. This is particularly true of the many assumptions needed to assess a defmed
benefit plans promised obligations. Obtaining this information is often a difficult task, inasmuch
as rules determining pension benefit eligibility and amounts frequently differ from one group of
employees to another and across cohorts. Sometimes benefit and contribution regulations have
internally inconsistent objectives. For all these reasons, it is a fairly laborious task to improve
reporting and disclosure patterns for public plans. The Government Accounting Standards Board
in the U.S. has devoted several years to the development of a standardized framework to be used
for reporting public pension plan liabilities and assets, and their work could be beneficially
reviewed by those seeking improved public pension plan performance.23
Outside the U.S., it is even more difficult to evaluate pension funding patterns. Data are
often insufficient with which to derive assumptions needed for projecting expected labor force
23Fiscal analysts in other countriesmay profit from the experiences of public pension managers in the United
States. A checklist of issueswhich should beconsidered is contained in Mitchell (1994 forthcoming).
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systems are not computerized,making itquite difficult to track investments and participant data. In
other cases, there may be significant evasion of public pension payroll taxes, which can make
projections of contribution and benefit flows politically disputatious.24
This discussion raises a more general question: how should public pension policies around
the world he evaluated? Mandated retirement savings programs in most nations are generally
subject to a plethora of government reslrictions --regardingwhere the funds can be invested
domestically and whether pension funds can be invested abroad, about the fund's exposure to
inflation and financial market risk, and related questions. Those contemplating mandating
retirement savings programs must recognize that these restrictions are a means of reallocating the
risks of retirement income security between the public and private sectors, which should be
explicitly acknowledged in designing pension funding and investment policy. Whether the social
costs of such programs offset their social benefits should be a question explicitly addressed.
A way to reframe this question is to ask why many U.S. state and local public pensions
tend to be relatively well-funded, at least as compared to federal plans in many other developed
nations which have employed PAYGO financing for some time. One explanation may be that
underfunding in the U.S. is limited becatise of states' and localities' mobile populations, who
respond to the additional tax burdens that underfunded plans must eventually impose. This theory
has little empirical support., however, since underfunded pension promises appear to be imperfectly
capitalized in property values (Epple and Shipper 1981). There is some suggestion that public
sector workers require a wage premium to compensate them for their underfunded pension
promises, and underfunded pensions may also affect government bond ratings (Smith 1981;
Mitchell and Smith 1994 forthcoming). These and other constraints will probably become
increasingly binding with more flexible international labor and capital mobility, and may further
restrict governments' ability to underfund public pension plans in the future.
24MitcheIl(1994forthcoming) cites examplesofdata and ta colle.ticn problems in developing countries.
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Some analysts suggest that the myriad reporting and funding issues surrounding publicly
managedpension planscan be reduced by substituting defined contribution plans in favor of
defined benefit plans. In this case, an employer promises only to deposit some contribution rate
into an account which then is invested, sometimes with the proviso that funds cannot be withdrawn
until retirement. In the United States, deferred compensation plans of this sort have become
increasingly popular since enabling tax law regarding these plans was clarified during the 1980's.
All states currently offer such plans to their public sector employees, generally in the form of
voluntary supplemental tax-deferred savings plans offered in addition to the conventional defined
benefit pension plan. A recent study indicated participation rates of about 24% of eligible workers
in the public sector. These plans are even more popular among private employees, where 57%of
eligible employees participate in 401(k) defined contribution offerings. The difference in
participation rates between public and private sectors is attributed to the fact that public employees
must make the entire contribution themselves arid the limit is currently $7,500peryear (or one-
third of compensation), while in the private sector the contribution limit is higher and companies
generally offer workers matching funds (EBRI 1993).
One appeal of these savings plans is that they are self-directed, so participants can
frequently tailor their investment portfolios individually. In recent years, however, analysts have
become concerned that employees participating in deferred pay plans tend to overconcent.rate their
investment portfolios in low-risk, low-return assets. As a consequence of their conservative
stance, future retirees may find that their retirement income is inadequate to meet needs (EBRI
1993). This objection is linked to a broader criticism of these plans, which is that they do not
necessarily generate subsistence income for retirees, inasmuch as eventual benefit amounts are
linked to contributions, not need (James 1993).
The appeal of mandatory defined contribution plans has been spurred by the recent
experiences of Chile's new retirement system. More than a decade ago, a replacement plan for the
country's foundering PAYGO social security system was created by formulating a mandatory
defined contribution plan, managed by several competing private investment houses. The Chilean
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system's popularity is in substantial partdueto high investment returns during the 1980's, which
exceeded thoseofother public retirement systems in Latin America (James 1993; Mesa Lago 1989,
1991). However little is yet known about how well the Chilean plan performed relative to an
internationally diversified portfolio, which is in principle the benchmark which participants would
wish to employ. During the first several years of the Chilean pension plan's operation, for
instance, the pension system's investment portfolio was limited almost exclusively to government
bonds, and only gradually has private domestic equity been permitted. Even more recently, the
Chilean defined contribution system has begun to introduce international asset holdings, though
these are still limited to a fraction of the pension ponfolio.
In sum, policyrnakers all over the world confront an aging population. and look to pension
plans to help meet the growing retirement n&ds. A key element in meeting these needs will be the
improvement of pension plan investment and funding performance. While the U.S. experience
cannot be generalized to all countries, it suggests that public pension performance responds to the
financial and administrative environment in which these plans operate. Retirement income security
for tomorrow requires designing better pension systems today.
25For discussionsof the Chileai experiencesee Baeza (1986), Baeza and Manubens(1988), Cheyre(1991), Diamond
(1992 and 93), Marcel and Asenas (1992), Myers (1985), Valdes Prieto (1993), and Wallich (1993).













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Public Pension System Characteristics:
U.S. State and Local Pension Plans




Number of Plans NA 2,589 2,387
Total Participants (000) NA 15,234 16,684
Active Participants (000) NA 10,364 11.357
Total Assets ($B current) $162 374 629
Annual Contributions ($B current) $21 37 44
Annual Benefits ($B current) $1 1 22 33
NA: Not available
Source: Piacentini andFoley(1992).
II. Survey of U.S. Public Pension Plan Participants in 1989
Pension Characteristic
Mean Retirement Benefit1 $9,318
Median Retirement Benefit1 $7,200
Median Public Pension as % of Pre-retirement Earnings (total)2 42%
Median Public Pension as % of Pre-retirement
Earnings for those not receiving Social Security3 50%
Fraction Receiving Any Post Retirement Benefit Increases4 34%
Fraction of Participants Covered by Defined Benefit Plan5 70%
Sources:
1Phillips (1992), Table 14,9: 367.
2Phillips (1992), Table 14.13: 371.
3Phillips (1992), Table 14.7: 375.
4Phillips (1992), Table 14.20: 379.
5Phillips (1992), Table14.25:384, Fraction excludes 10% of respondents unable to identify plan type.
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U.S. Pension Plan Portfolios:
Size and Allocation 1950-1989









I. State and local government pension plans
1950 $4.9 0.0% 12.2% 51.0% 36.7%
1955 10.8 1.9 25.0 43.5 29.6
1960 19.7 3.0 36.0 29.9 31.0
1965 34.1 7.3 50.4 22.3 19.9
1970 60.3 16.7 58.2 10.9 14.1
1975 104.8 23.2 59.0 7.4 10.4
1980 198.1 22.4 47.7 20.2 9.7
1985 404.7 29.7 31.9 30.5 7.9
1989 727.4 39.9 27.3 27.2 5.5
II.Private pension plans
Noninsured:
1950 $7.1 15.5% 39.4% 32.4% 12.7%
1955 18.3 33.3 43.2 16.4 7.1
1960 38.1 43.3 41.2 7.1 8.4
1965 74.4 54.8 30.5 4.0 10.6
1970 112.0 59.9 26.2 2.7 11.2
1975 225.0 48,0 18.6 8.0 25.4
1980 469.6 47.6 16.5 10.8 25.1
1985 848.4 46.4 14.3 12.3 27.0
1989 1,163.5 57.3 12.4 12.3 18.0
Insured:
1950 4.8 4.2 41.7 22.9 31.2
1955 10.1 4.0 43.6 9.9 42.6
1960 16.8 4.8 43.5 6.0 45.8
1965 25.5 6.3 41.6 3.5 48.6
1970 37.5 13.6 37.6 2.4 46.4
1975 64.6 18.6 37.5 2.2 41.8
1980 152.2 16.0 39.9 3.7 40.3
1985 337.9 13.0 . 35.7 12.9 38.4
1989 525.8 12.3 39.8 11.6 36.3
Note: Insured plans are pension plans whose assets are held by insurance companies.
Source: Hoffman and Mondejar (1992), T. 16.9 and 10: 438-441.
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Public pension plan data from SEI Financial Services reported by Berkowitz & Logue (1986). T. All1-3.
2 Large U.S. privateplan data from SEI Financial Services reported by McCarthy & Turner (1992) T. 12.1: 253.
U.S. private plan data from 5500 Reports reported by McCarthy and Turner (1992)T. 12.1: 253.
4Large Canadian private pension plan data, SET Financial Services iepnrted by Pesando and Hyatt (1992) T. 1: 21.
McCarthy and Turner (1992). Table 12.1: 253.
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U.S. Public Sector Pension Plan Yields:
Annual Averages 1984-1990




































1Zorn (1991), T. Vfl-7: 34; 129 plans.
2Zorn (1990), T. 34: 834; 108 plans.
3Zorn (1991), T. V11.8: 35; 85 plans.
4Zorn (1991), T. VI1-9: 36; 85 plans.
5Zorn (1990). 1. 35: B35; 113 plans.
6Zorn (1990), T. 36: B36; 85 plans.
7lbbotsonAssociates(1992), 1'. 13: 34.
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U.S.Public and Private Pension Plan Funding Ratios
Ratio of Pension Plan Assets
to Pension Plan Liabilities Fraction of Plans













1Authors' adaptation of unpublished data from GAO.
2Piacentini and Foley (1992), Table 4.20: 153.
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30Table 6
Determinants of Investment Returns
in U.S. State and Local Pension Plans
(standard errors in parentheses)
Explanatory Variable
Dependent Variable






































Notes to Table 6:￿ 1.96, *￿1.65 (< 1.96). Both models also include a constant term as well as controls for
plan type (TCHRPLAN), plan size (ASSETS and SSETSW), and the fraction of the plan assets held in bonds and
stock (BOND. STOCK). See the Appendix Table for variable descriptions and descriptive statistics.
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BDELAC
BDELRT
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Table 7
FundingDeterminants of U.S. State and









217Notes to Table 7: "t ￿ 1.96. t ￿ 1.65 (< 1.96). Both models also include a constant term as well as controls for
plan type and union (TCHRI'LAI4, UNION), benefit differences across workers (BENTIERSI, whether the plan was
integrated with social security or indexed (SSINT, COLA), whether the unit credit method was employed
(ACTUARUC). the plans average retirement age (AVRETAGE). and whether the plan reported its retirement age,
amortization period, wage growth, inflation, and expected rate of return assumptions (AVRETAGMS, AMORTMS.
WDOTMS, INFLMS, EXPRORMS). See the Appendix Table for variable descriptions and descriptive statistics.
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VariableDefinitions
Note:Variables qualitative (0,1) unless specified. All variables derived from PENDAT file (see Zero 1991) unless
otherwise indicated.
DependentVariables
YRIROR Annual(1990) rate of return reported in survey (%).
YR5ROR: Average annualized rate ofreturn 1986-90 reported in survey().
AST_PBO: Reported pension system assets / PBO measure of cumulative plan liabilities (%).
FLOWFIJND: Annual actual/required employer plan contributions (%).
Explanatory Variables
A. Pension Board Composition
BDELAC: Fractionof pension Board elected by active employees (%).
BDELRT: Fraction of penion Board elected by retired employees (%).
LIABINS: Board covered by liability insurance.
BDACTOK: Board required to authorize actuarial assumptions.
BDBENOK: Boardrequired to authorize benefit amounts.
B.Pension Management Practices
ADINVST: Administrative cost charged to pension investment income.
INVINHS: Investment staff of pension portfolio partly (or fully) managed in-house.
ACCINHS: Accounting staff needs of pension system partly (or fully) met in-house.
TOPIOMG: Investments handled by top-lO performance bracket managers (Laknonishok eta!. 1992).
TOPIO*EXT: Plan investments exclusively handled by top-b money managers.
C.Pension Investment Practices
PRUDMAN: Pension Board required to act according to "prudent man' rule.
INSTATE: Fraction of pension investments which-mucte directed in-state (%).
STKMAX: Maximum limitation on the assets in the pension portfolio.
D.Pension Reporting Practices
INDINVPF: Pension system obtains independent investment performance evaluations.
FREQVAL: Frequency of independent performance evaluations.
R.EPSOLO: System issues own financial report (not integrated with other budgets).
GIVERPT: Plan participants receive annual financial report.
AMORTPER: Amortization period for past service liabilities.
AMORTMS: Amortization period not stated.
ACTUARUC: Pension system uses unit credit method of computing pension liabilities.
E.Pension Assumptions
Benefitspartially (or fully) indexed after retirement.
Future salary growth assumption required to compute PBO.
Salary growth assumption not stated.
Employees moving within state may carry benefit accruals to new plans.
Interest rate assumption used in computing PBO (%).
Interest rate assumption not stated.
Cost of living assumption required to compute PBO.
Cost of living assumption not stated.
Average retirement age used in computing PBO (yrs).
Average retirement age not stated.
Plan integrated with Social Security.
State has legal funding standard for pension system.
State law does not prohibit carryover of state budget deficit from one year to the next
(National Association of State Budget Officers 1992)
System covers at least some teachers and other school employees.
















ASSETS: Actuarial valueofpension system assets, typically at market value (million S).
ASSETSQ: Squared value of ASSETS.
BOND: Pension system portfolio held in corporate and government bonds (%).
STOCK: Pension system portfolio held in stock (%).
BNOCUT: State has law guaranteeing benefit amounts.
RENTERS: Benefits differ according to worker hire date.
ISUNION: At least some employees covered by pension systemunionized.
SPECTAX: Special or dedicated tax is the source of employer contributions.
UNEMPD: Recent (1990) level of unemployment minus long run (1981-89) average level of
unemployment level in the state (US Bureau of the Census 1991).
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